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MAKING AND UNMAKING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
CREATIVE PRODUCTION IN LEGAL AND CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVE, edited by Mario Biagioli, Peter Jaszi, and Martha 
Woodmansee. University of Chicago Press, 2011. 480 pp. Hardback 
$115.00, Paperback $40.00. 
Reviewed by Rebecca Tushnet, Georgetown University Law Center. 
rlt26@law.georgetown.edu 
This fine collection features a roster of excellent scholars in and out of law 
schools.  Many of the pieces are edited and de-footnoted versions of work 
available elsewhere,1 whose value here comes from aggregation and 
contrast.  The remixing is thematically appropriate given the topics and 
commitments of most participants.  The majority of the papers grew out of a 
Society for Critical Exchange conference, “Con/texts of Invention: Creative 
Production in Legal and Cultural Perspective,” in 2006 (p.vii). 
Insightfully, the editors point out that much criticism of current IP regimes 
comes from scholars who are dissatisfied with IP’s institutions, rather than 
with its normative commitments to capitalism, ownership, and creativity 
(p.6).  But the claim that current IP law is bad for innovation assumes the 
neutrality of the idea of “innovation,” and invites further investigation.  This 
collection does so with interdisciplinarity in its DNA—not just because law 
needs the insights from other disciplines, though it does, but also because of 
the way that IP has affected how other academic disciplines constitute and 
regulate themselves, from copyright permissions to materials licensing by 
scientific researchers (p.10). 
The book is divided into five general areas.  The first is High and Low: IP 
Practices and Materialities, which turns out to be about the history of 
patents.  Mario Biagioli’s “Patent Specification and Political 
Representation: How Patents Became Rights” argues that patents shifted 
from monopoly grants designed to promote technological transfer to 
documents that described inventions in sufficient detail to enable third 
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parties to practice them as part of a political shift (p.25).  He suggests that 
representative democracy created the conditions under which a patent 
“bargain” between inventors and citizens was possible, focusing on 
disclosure to the public via the specification.  A key consequence of this 
new idea of what a patent should be was the requirement of true invention, 
replacing the past practice of allowing patents to be granted based on 
copying from some other jurisdiction. 
The specification and the focus on mental invention in turn made it 
plausible to grant rights to all embodiments covered by the specifications, 
thus altering the patent from a right to a particular machine to a right to the 
immaterial essence of the invention.  Utility and reduction to practice took a 
back seat as the patent became a text, rather than a technology transfer tool.  
Biagioli’s claim is not so much causal—he doesn’t present evidence of 
explicit political thinking directly linked to these changes—but relational: 
different thoughts about patents became easier to think once the patent 
“bargain” with the public replaced grants to advance the economic interests 
of the state. 
Kara Swanson picks up the story with “Authoring an Invention: Patent 
Production in the Nineteenth-Century United States” (p.41).  Like Biagioli, 
she focuses on the patent as text: a document produced with the assistance 
of experts who shape the form of the patent but still attribute authorship to 
the “inventor” listed on the patent.  Thus, the rhetoric of patents was similar 
to that surrounding the romantic author in copyright, despite all the helpers 
behind the scenes.  Patent lawyers spoke of the inventor as a genius in need 
of a ghostwriter, splitting the author-function between the invention and the 
patent.  Yet the authorial function of the patent lawyer was successfully 
submerged, so that courts now don’t hesitate to identify inventors as 
“authors” of their patents. 
William J. Rankin then turns the focus to patents’ imagined audiences in 
“The ‘Person Skilled in the Art’ Is Really Quite Conventional: U.S. Patent 
Drawings and the Persona of the Inventor, 1870-2005” (p.55).  Patent 
drawings have contradictory functions: they disclose an invention to the 
public, but it’s also in the inventor’s interest to depict an invention as 
generically as possible to increase the patent’s scope.  Thus, patent 
drawings must both appear to depict real objects and also “leave 
unanswered many questions of manufacture, assembly, or specific 
materials” (p.57).  The Patent Office specified numerous conventions of 
depiction, including even the angle from which light was to come in the 
drawing.  Initially, the standard conventions made patents intelligible “at a 
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glance” and implied that all forms of invention were fundamentally the 
same and could be understood by the same type of person.  Over time, 
however, the drawings reflected increasing specialization, becoming more 
like engineering drawings and thus easily comprehensible only to those 
already familiar with the relevant art.  The imagined audience is now 
“ordinary colleagues and competitors,” not the public (p.72), which creates 
interesting questions for Biagioli’s argument about the democratic nature of 
the patent bargain in an age of expertise. 
The second section, Before and After the Commons and Traditional 
Knowledge, begins with Rosemary J. Coombe’s “Cultural Agencies: The 
Legal Construction of Community Subjects and Their Properties” (p.79).  
It’s a theoretical examination of the interactions between international 
norms and local communities and the ways in which those communities use 
legal concepts for their own ends—or see them used.  As Coombe points 
out, “[t]o the extent that international treaties and emerging legal norms 
demand that communities provide consent for the use of their knowledge 
and resources, such communities must be found, and if they cannot be 
located on one scale, those bearing obligations to secure consent will 
inevitably find ‘communities’ at another scale who are prepared to bargain” 
(p.86). 
Marilyn Strathern contributes “Social Invention,” a categorization of 
approaches to intellectual property, from relations of enthusiasm versus 
antagonism to breadth versus narrowness and communal versus individual 
rightsholders (p.99).  Mark Perlman’s “From ‘Folklore’ to ‘Knowledge’ in 
Global Governance” then traces the history and politics of the changing 
terminology of international negotiations on protections for “traditional” IP, 
arguing that just as authorship has been understood in different ways over 
time, so has the category of the unauthored, which affects both the 
definitions of what’s at stake and the concepts of who might be empowered 
to exercise authority over it (p.115). 
Christopher Kelty, in “Inventing Copyleft,” examines a different set of 
actors: programmers who used concepts of what software programming was 
and should be alongside their understandings of IP law to create open-
source licensing (p.133).  Though the actors here are predominantly male, 
Western, and neither governmental nor part of traditional communities, 
they, like the subjects of Coombe’s and Perlman’s pieces, appealed to field-
specific expertise as a way to shape the claims of IP law to define and 
govern their respective fields.  Despite some language of resistance, 
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advocates of free and open source software could never escape the claims of 
IP law, only negotiate with it. 
In the spirit of negotiation, Yochai Benkler’s “Designing Cooperative 
Systems for Knowledge Production: An Initial Synthesis from Experimental 
Economics,” offers a roadmap for commons-based production, with a 
variety of “design levers” that might be used to create sustainable systems 
(p.149).  Systems that work, he suggests, will: humanize other participants; 
build trust; increase communication; reinforce norms of cooperation; and 
provide both fair outcomes and fair processes, where what is “fair” is highly 
variable; construct a group identity; and provide mechanisms for dealing 
with troublesome participants (sometimes by allowing punishment for 
defectors, but not always).  Other relevant features of system design include 
transparency—we care about openness but also about privacy—the level of 
self-selection for participants; the cost of a particular structure; the extent to 
which some kinds of rewards may crowd out others; and the nature of 
sustainable leadership, especially in a context where outsiders may think 
that lead contributors are “suckers carrying free riders on their back[s]” 
(p.161).  Of particular note is Benkler’s point that fairness is most easily 
assessed in a system where contributions are of the same general type.  
Where contributions are not commensurable or symmetric, so that some 
people provide labor, others physical capital, and others financial capital, 
fairness will be both harder to define and harder to monitor, both of which 
create problems for cooperation (p.155). 
The third section of the volume, IP Crimes and Other Fictions, begins with 
Lawrence Liang’s excellent “Beyond Representation: The Figure of the 
Pirate,” which provocatively challenges the standard IP restrictionist line 
that noncommercial users and remixers are sympathetic figures while 
commercial pirates are obviously to be suppressed (p.167).  His argument 
that critical theorists have ignored commercial pirates because they deal in 
the realm of pleasure (p.168), which generally poses uncomfortable 
problems for Western legal theory, rings true.2  Piracy doesn’t seem to be a 
very good example of citizenship, resistance, or creativity, all things that IP 
restrictionists celebrate when contesting the expansion of copyright and 
other IP laws.  Noncommercial downloading is a Western/high-bandwidth 
phenomenon, while piracy is associated with Asia, and thus the 
condemnation of commercial pirates also has a racial and geopolitical 
component. (For those interested in a fuller discussion of the realities of 
piracy in emerging economies, the Social Science Research Council has 
recently published an excellent set of nation-specific studies.3) 
The IP Law Book Review  4 
Liang can’t quite escape the desire to find creativity among his pirates: he 
argues that pirate networks of distribution involve innovation in difficult 
circumstances, generating low-cost infrastructure (p.174).  He then suggests 
that “[t]he epics, stories, songs, and sagas that represent in some ways the 
collective heritage of humanity have survived only because their custodians 
took care not to lock them into a system of end usage; instead they 
embellished them, adding to their health and vitality before passing them on 
to others” (p.176).  If we really valued pure curation—something that is 
perhaps only possible in a system of mechanical reproduction—then we’d 
at least want to have the old versions to compare to the embellished ones.  
Liang’s challenge is to ask how we came to value creativity as a universal 
good; implicitly, he also asks us to reevaluate how we define creativity. 
Martha Woodmansee reaches further into the past with “Publishers, 
Privateers, Pirates: Eighteenth-Century German Book Piracy Revisited,” 
where she tracks the geographic and political divisions that led some 
German states to encourage reprinting of foreigners’ works as a means of 
cultural development. Printers and authors in other states condemned this as 
piracy, even though it was not against the law (p.181).  This is a familiar 
modern narrative, and one Adrian Johns has recently explored at length in 
the British context,4 but Woodmansee’s article shows just how persistent 
the dynamic is: copying legally unprotected content is one way in which 
developing states have long supported the education of their populations 
and the development of technological capacity.  
Speaking of Adrian Johns, his contribution to the volume, “The Property 
Police,” traces how IP law developed historically alongside IP enforcement, 
beginning with publishers’ own enforcement activities in early modern 
Europe (p.199).  Johns argues that the industry devoted to finding and 
stopping “pirates” has always had a profound influence on what piracy is.  
Despite the development of professional police organizations, private 
policing in IP still exists, and can now often recruit public prosecutors.  
Johns links copyright and patent enforcement; both have required large 
private investigative forces, and both have raised concerns for heavy-
handed invasions of privacy. 
Tarleton Gillespie’s “Characterizing Copyright in the Classroom: The 
Cultural Work of Antipiracy Campaigns” moves from enforcers to 
educators, examining various pro-copyright curricula promoted by industry 
organizations designed to teach children and young adults that unauthorized 
downloading is the same thing as theft and that copying without paying is 
always wrong (p.215).  As he points out, this framing ignores the existence 
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of fair use and other limitations on copyright, along with public domain or 
freely shared works.  The idea that nothing is really “free” might suit late 
crony capitalism, but it’s not very democratic.  These campaigns attempt to 
convince students that there is a clear creator/audience hierarchy, and that 
the only available aspiration for a creative student is to join the ranks of 
paid professionals—whose interests are profoundly harmed by unauthorized 
copying.  Students are not supposed to be remixers or noncommercial 
creators, just fans who leave no traces of their own: “The recurring imagery 
of headphones and air guitar is an ironic reminder: this uncanny absence of 
production marks how fanhood here is understood entirely as an act of 
consumption” (p.227).  As Gillespie concludes, such campaigns ignore 
changing legal markets and fail to give children tools to distinguish more 
clearly between legitimate and illegitimate unauthorized uses, to the 
probable detriment of the copyright industries themselves as well as of 
creators more generally. 
Peter DiCola’s “An Economic View of Legal Restrictions on Musical 
Borrowing and Appropriation” then turns to more conventional law-and-
economics analysis (p.235).  Because music is both input and output, and 
because rights in music have been carved up in complicated and sometimes 
unpredictable ways, it’s hard to move from theory to practice, and DiCola 
spends most of his time categorizing musicians’ options under various 
conditions and levels of uncertainty.  In the end, he suggests, constraints 
may spur creativity, the way that complex tax laws spur tax avoidance—and 
tax evasion.  I don’t disagree, but I do wonder whether economics gives us 
useful tools for distinguishing good constraints from bad ones.  When he 
says that musicians who violate a boundary may add interest to their music, 
or fulfill an artistic commitment to transgression by creating “illegal” art 
(pp.246-47), I can’t help asking who benefits and who pays under such a 
scheme.  For one thing, gendered distinctions in the acceptability of 
transgression—both to enforcers and to potential transgressors 
themselves—mean that deterrence is unlikely to operate equally for male 
and female artists.  Accepting the constraints entailed in writing a sonnet is 
not really the same thing as accepting the constraints entailed in not ever 
using any samples without clearing them with the rightsholder. 
Section 4, Old Things into New IP Objects, centers around patent law and 
its discontents.  Daniel J. Kevles starts off with “New Blood, New Fruits: 
Protections for Breeders and Originators, 1789-1930,” discussing private 
and public regimes for protecting lines of animals and plants (p.253).  
Bringing in private regimes allows Kevles to point out that public regulation 
offered some consumer protection-like guarantees of quality or at least 
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accuracy, compared to less reliable private registries.  Ultimately, plant 
breeders succeeded in getting legal protection for seizing on chance 
variations in the field.  Plant patents thus provide a useful contrast to the 
inventive requirements of a utility patent as detailed by Biagioli. 
Alain Pottage and Brad Sherman’s “Kinds, Clones, and Manufactures” then 
argues that the modern patent system grew up alongside, and at its core is 
most comfortable with, mechanically reproducible consumer goods (and the 
expensive machines that produced them) (p.269).  The very proliferation of 
identical copies demonstrated the primacy of the abstract design behind 
those copies.  Biological materials, however, offered very different 
relationships between the first in the series and the next, creating conceptual 
difficulties that the law preferred to ignore rather than work out.  Plant 
breeders who picked the best mutations were “inventors after the fact” 
(p.277) who convinced policymakers that cloning was basically a quasi-
industrial process, ignoring the absence of design or conception in the sense 
used for utility patents. But this puts pressure on the patent bargain, since a 
written description is unlikely to be of much use compared to possession of 
the biological means of production.  Thus, patents on biological material 
will continue to pose difficulties for the patent system. 
Cori Hayden’s “No Patent, No Generic: Pharmaceutical Access and the 
Politics of the Copy” leaves the U.S. system behind to examine the 
Argentine and Mexican systems (p.285).  In Argentina, pharmaceutical 
patents are functionally unavailable, but brands have taken their place to a 
certain extent; the first or most successful entity to produce a drug still has a 
market advantage.  In Mexico, as in the U.S., generics have been promoted 
as a way to “counter the dominance of expensive foreign-made patented 
drugs” (p.287) and major drug companies have responded by touting the 
quality of the original.  In Argentina, however, the conventional opposition 
of patented drugs (private property) and legal generics (public domain) is 
insufficient: Argentina’s nonpatented copies of drugs are neither, and often 
outcompete the “originator” based on the power of the domestic 
manufacturer’s brand name.  Moreover, high Argentine prices based on 
branding and on relationships with medical providers created the same need 
for lower-cost versions as exists in Mexico and the U.S.  As Mark McKenna 
has suggested, patent and trademark protection may be able to substitute for 
one another to a certain extent, and thus IP regimes cannot be evaluated in 
isolation5—although a regime with only one, as in Argentina, may have a 
very different form than a regime with both. 
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Jonathan Kahn, in “Inventing Race as a Genetic Commodity in 
Biotechnology Patents,” then turns to a recent strategy for achieving patent 
protection for a drug, or method of use of a drug, that might not otherwise 
qualify: claiming special utility in a racially defined population (p.305).  
Race-based patents create economic incentives to engage in race-based 
clinical research, drug development, and marketing, thus turning race not 
just into biological fact but into legal right and economic payoff, which may 
be far more robust and socially powerful. 
Pamela Samuelson’s “The Strange Odyssey of Software Interfaces as 
Intellectual Property” covers the roving IP history of interfaces, from trade 
secret to copyright and, when the courts approved reverse engineering as 
fair use, to patent (p.321).  Samuelson once argued for sui generis 
protection for software,6 but here concedes that the ship has sailed.  A 
combination of trade secret, contract, and patent controls rights in software, 
including interfaces, today.  Ultimately, she suggests, the industry worked 
around the various legal regimes, remaining highly creative no matter what 
form of protection was in vogue. 
The final section, Doing and Undoing Collaborative IP, is the most far-
flung.  It begins with Evelyn Lincoln’s “Invention, Origin, and Dedication: 
Republishing Women’s Prints in Early Modern Italy,” which argues that 
printmakers who selected which engravings to make prints of and added 
their own dedications to those prints were asserting themselves as authors 
(p.339).  Their curation and selection of appropriate images deserved credit, 
which they claimed by adding their own names as well.  Lincoln argues that 
cultural pressures against women receiving too much public recognition 
made such practices particularly appropriate for female printmakers, who 
could participate in creative life as long as they signed and dedicated images 
“invented” by others rather than making their own.  Patrons, too, including 
female patrons, were given credit as the moving force behind the creation of 
particular prints. 
Tim Lenoir and Eric Giannella’s “Technological Platforms and the Layers 
of Patent Data” then jumps far ahead in time, arguing that patents make the 
most sense when understood as embedded in a network of other inventions 
(p.359).  Network analysis then allows them to trace relationships between 
patents (and patenting researchers and firms) and figure out which are the 
most significant. They argue that such quantitative studies can usefully 
supplement more qualitative approaches in science and technology studies. 
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Dotan Oliar and Christopher Sprigman’s “Intellectual Property Norms in 
Stand-Up Comedy,” by contrast, focuses on an extralegal regime (p.385).  
Stand-up comics don’t use IP law for various reasons. Instead, they protect 
their jokes through anticopying norms and, perhaps most significantly, by 
shifting in the modern era to a particular type of comedy: identity-based, 
individualized comedy that would be difficult for anyone else to copy 
successfully.  This result, they argue persuasively, should draw our attention 
to the fact that IP regimes affect not just the quantity but the kind of IP 
produced.  They also highlight that informal IP regimes can’t tolerate the 
kinds of rights-slicing and careful distinctions that formal IP regimes can, 
because norm-based enforcement would be too difficult if the rules weren’t 
extremely easy to understand.  Only one person can own a joke, and that’s 
the person who provided the premise or hired a joke-writer, regardless of 
whether formal copyright law would assign rights differently. 
Fiona Murray’s “Patenting Life: How the Oncomouse Patent Changed the 
Lives of Mice and Men” examines the community of cancer researchers.  
They too have norms that changed over time as patent protection became 
more salient (p.339).  After the attempted commercialization of mice with 
important cancer-related genes caused huge controversy, academic 
researchers adapted rather than rejecting patents outright.  While academic 
freedom still plays a major role in community beliefs about the appropriate 
use of patents, researchers also adopted patents as another measure of 
academic success, alongside journal publication, and used patented mice to 
negotiate relationships among scientists, including the allocation of credit. 
Peter Jaszi concludes with “Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern 
Copyright?” in which he argues that a constellation of recent cases suggests 
that courts are absorbing a postmodern ethos from the general culture, in 
which expertise plays less of a role in evaluating creative works and in 
which the audience gets more credit and control (p.413).  This is a 
fascinating thesis, though I’m not sure the very distinct cases on which he 
focuses—Jeff Koons’s reversal of fortune from Rogers v. Koons to Blanch 
v. Koons (acceptance of appropriation art as legitimately transformative 
based on the change in meaning worked by the appropriation), Sony v. 
Universal Studios (acceptance of audience interest in receiving works and 
making meaning from them), and Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings 
(acceptance of the idea that some copies are so transitory that they are 
outside the control of copyright law)—can be put together to support his 
claim.  But it would be extremely nice to think so. 
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Overall, this is an excellent collection that would be a great supplement to 
an advanced IP or IP theory course.  If there’s anything missing, it’s a 
contribution from a scholar who is willing to discuss cultural issues on the 
same terms as the other contributors but who generally supports the 
expansion of intellectual property rights.  This is not to say that the volume 
is unbalanced, especially since so many of the pieces are historical or 
analytic rather than prescriptive, but the collection does reflect the IP-
restrictionist tendencies of many legal scholars (which I happen to think are 
correct). 
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COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY, by Isabella Alexander. Hart Publishing, 
2010. 320 pp. Hardback $110. 
Reviewed by H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, Lewis & Clark Law School. 
tomas@lclark.edu 
Few areas of the law have been more affected by the advent of the Internet 
and digital media than copyright law.  Judges, litigants, and scholars often 
struggle to delineate the proper relationship between proprietors and users 
in this digital age.  This has become especially true after eBay,1 in which 
the Supreme Court reinvigorated several neglected factors for obtaining 
injunctive relief in intellectual property cases, including whether granting 
an injunction would serve the public interest. Practitioners and scholars now 
regularly find themselves consulting past instances where technology and 
other factors tested the bounds of copyright law, sometimes with a desire to 
adhere to past principles and practices and other times with a view to 
ensuring that we do not unwittingly repeat them. To help move forward, we 
are looking backward. 
The history of English copyright law—which forms the foundation of 
Anglo-American copyright law—has remained especially relevant.  In 
resolving doctrinal and normative queries, judges and scholars, including 
those in the United States, continue to refer to cases and statutes from 
England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Indeed, there has been 
an explosion of interest in recent years on the origins of copyright.  Often 
pitted against each other in modern copyright debates is whether the initial 
justification for copyright policy was to recognize and reward an author’s 
right in her work (be it a natural right or otherwise), on the one hand, or to 
promote the public interest, on the other.   
In her recent book, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, Isabella Alexander, explores these 
debates by investigating the “historical pedigree of claims that copyright 
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operates in the public interest, whether as an overarching goal, or through 
the balancing of competing claims,” especially as against the rhetoric of 
romantic authorship (p.3).  Alexander focuses primarily on the nineteenth 
century, which she notes was the period during which copyright law took a 
quantum leap forward. She concludes that though the public interest had a 
significant rhetorical impact on copyright law, the concept cannot bear the 
weight often given to it by modern scholars (p.4), largely because the 
“public interest” was so variable during the time periods she examines.  
Oftentimes the public interest was plausibly invoked by parties on both 
sides of a given debate, diluting any decisive value of the concept.   
As the only book to date that focuses directly on the public interest in its 
historical context, Alexander’s monograph is a welcome addition to the 
body of scholarship on the history of copyright law.  This is especially so 
given that the book is very well researched and executed.  
COPYRIGHT LAW begins by introducing the reader to the various works 
on copyright history that have preceded it, thus placing its own contribution 
to the literature in context (pp.4–11).  Alexander concisely marshals the 
dozen or so principal works on the history of copyright into a digestible 
primer.  Apart from serving its principal purpose, this primer will be 
especially useful for those lacking either the time or the inclination to 
peruse the key works in the field.  
Recognizing that a work on a particular period often requires a discussion 
of the period that preceded it to provide the proper context, Alexander’s 
first substantive chapter (ch. 2) discusses early instances in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries where stakeholders in the debate over copyright 
began to visibly invoke the public interest as a means of achieving their 
objectives.  She notes that it was right holders who argued as early as 1641 
that exclusive printing rights were in the public interest because they 
provided authors and their booksellers the encouragement necessary to 
write and publish literary works.  Alexander also explains how references to 
the public interest became much more pronounced in the mid-to-late 
eighteenth century in the battle in the King’s Bench2 and House of Lords3 
over whether a perpetual copyright at common law existed independent of 
the Statute of Anne of 1710 (which had limited statutory terms).  Here, she 
notes, the rhetoric of the “public interest” was invoked by litigants and 
judges on both sides of the equation.  Advocates for the common-law right 
towed the same line from 1641, that the public would suffer from a lack of 
learning if copyrights were not protected at common law.  Advocates 
against the right argued that a perpetual monopoly would hurt the public as 
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it would lead to higher prices on books and could even be abused as a form 
of censorship (pp.30–37).   
Although the House of Lords ultimately rejected the idea of a perpetual 
copyright at common law, Alexander challenges prior interpretations of this 
event which conclude that the Lords had rejected as specious that the public 
interest could be served by a perpetual right. She notes that the same House 
of Lords enacted legislation soon afterward granting a perpetual copyright 
to the universities for books bequeathed to them in perpetuity (p.37).  As 
Alexander puts it, the “notion that the laws regulating literary property 
should serve a public interest was affirmed, but its precise nature remained 
unclear” (Id.). 
The remainder of Alexander’s book tracks and explores the various ways in 
which the “public interest” concept rears its head in the nineteenth century.  
Rather than continue her analysis in a purely chronological order, 
Alexander uses several themes as points of departure.  They include: the 
making of books available to libraries under the requirements of legal 
deposit (pp.47–63); regulating books of dubious merit through copyright 
law and other ways to protect the public (pp.63–79); the role the public 
interest played in shaping debates over the expansion of copyright to new 
subject matter, such as plays, lectures, and music (pp.81–112, 128–140), to 
new people, such as to authors from outside of Britain, and to new places, 
such as for British authors publishing abroad (pp.113–154); and how the 
public interest was discussed in lawsuits and legislative proposals involving 
the prima-facie rights of copyright law, including the duration of copyright 
and whether to broaden a proprietor’s bundle of rights to include preventing 
others from extracting or abridging the proprietor’s works or from making 
transformative works of the same (pp.155–233).  Alexander ends her book 
by bringing all of these themes together under the rubric of the Imperial 
Copyright Act of 1911—the omnibus legislation that codified copyright in 
Britain and its dependents (pp.234–290). 
Alexander draws several conclusions from her research.  There are two 
which are, in my view, paramount.  The first is that modern scholars have 
overstated the historical importance of the “public interest” as the 
determinative factor in copyright’s development.  In fact, the concept was 
very amorphous.  As Alexander concludes in one part of her book: “The 
‘public’ itself was far from being a constant or coherent construct” in the 
debates (p.154).  Moreover, the “interest” was also fluid and could serve 
many masters:  “[T]he rhetoric of public interest, in its multitude of forms 
was used both to resist and to support the expansion of copyright law” (Id.).  
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In reading her book, I too was struck by how often the rhetoric of public 
interest was unhelpful to decision makers (be it the courts or the legislature) 
in deciding the issues before them.  
The second major conclusion Alexander draws from her research is that the 
undoubted expansion of copyright law during the nineteenth century was 
not, by process of elimination, a singular triumph of the ideal of romantic 
authorship.  Instead, Alexander concludes that a third, as yet unsung, factor 
played a much more important role in the development of copyright policy.  
She posits that concerns over market competition and the promotion of 
commerce regularly emerged unscathed (or what I might call the tie-
breaker) from battles between the ideals of romantic authorship and public 
interest.  In her own words:  “Despite the claims of many commentators that 
the law of infringement represents a balance between the interests of the 
public and those of the copyright owner, this book highlights the central 
role of competition and the demands of the market in the law’s 
development” (p.233). 
The reader will, of course, have to draw his or her own conclusions from 
the evidence presented by Alexander.  But her interpretations and reasoning 
are well supported.  As a consequence, serious students and scholars of the 
history of copyright law—whether specialists or not—must now add 
Alexander’s book to their reading list.  I learned much from it. 
ENDNOTES 
1 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
2 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (K.B. 1769). 
3 Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 2 Bro. PC 129, 17 Cobb. Parl. Hist. 
953 (H.L. 1774). 
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“It is a little surprising that one can apply for a patent in Kiribati” (p.1). So 
begins Peter Drahos’ fascinating exploration of the ubiquity and often 
under-appreciated influence of patent offices around the globe. 
THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES 
AND THEIR CLIENTS covers the results of an in-depth, interview-based 
study of 45 patent offices, their operations and policies, and how they fit 
into the larger global patent network.   Of course the large patent offices are 
covered (e.g., the IP5 members that receive the largest numbers of 
applications: the U.S.(USPTO), Japan (JPO), China (SIPO), South Korea 
(KIPO) and the regional European (EPO) patent offices), but Drahos also 
includes a diverse cross section of other kinds of offices.1    Emerging 
economy offices in India and Brazil, regional offices in addition to the EPO, 
developing and least developed country offices such as Cambodia, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, and Kiribati, entrepreneurial offices such as those in the UK, 
Denmark, and Australia are all represented and tied together in a novel and 
eye-opening construct that sheds important new light on a system which 
may, by Drahos’ account, be anything but benign. 
As Drahos himself labels patent office administration “an excruciatingly 
dull topic” (p.xiv), one validly might approach this book with some 
trepidation.  Such concerns are completely unfounded as Drahos turns this 
enquiry into an intriguing and enlightening explanation of “why our [patent] 
world is the way it is” (p.xiv) and what we might do to change it.  The book 
is well-researched, engaging, and filled to the brim with thought-provoking 
nuggets of current and historical information.  Even the book’s organization 
is impressive; beginning by providing a contextual and linguistic framework 
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for the study and its results, then discussing well-designed groupings of 
offices, their origins and particular features, and their role and position in 
the global patent order.  
Drahos asserts, then supports, the contention that patent offices around the 
world are cooperating and integrating into a global knowledge governance 
network that exists primarily to serve the interests of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) sometimes at the expense of, and counter to the 
interests and policy of, the domestic government and consumers of the 
country in which the office operates.  According to Drahos, the goal of 
MNCs is to create uniform global patent rules to “make it cheap to obtain 
patents, that maximize the scope of patentable subject matter and that 
minimize state control over the technology” all in an effort to build a system 
of private taxation2 of technology markets (pp.4-5). The fact that one can 
obtain a patent in Kirabati, a very poor island nation with a population of 
around 100,000 people,3 is, according to Drahos, emblematic of this goal.   
Articulating a modified version of the social contract justification for the 
patent system as “society offering a monopoly in exchange for the release 
of an invention of social value,” Drahos posits that patent offices are not 
currently fulfilling their role in the contract.  Namely, in representing 
society, patent offices have the duty to (1) ensure an inventor delivers (not 
just discloses) an invention of social value, (2) help diffuse invention 
information that the inventor reveals in the application process, and (3) 
ensure the highest degree of patent system transparency to those the system 
affects (pp.33-34).  Drahos sees patent offices as violating these duties in a 
number of ways, such as failing to require access to source code for 
software inventions and not providing comprehensive, user-friendly search 
systems to make it easy for the public to find relevant patents.  The reasons 
why patent offices fail—often knowingly—in their public good functions 
are the focus of this book.  
After laying his foundational premises, Drahos launches into a deep yet 
concise and eminently interesting history of the role and rise of patent 
offices in the global patent system.  He traces the rise of specific patent 
offices, noting along the way interesting historical vignettes that support the 
longstanding primacy of the patent social contract, such as the early 
Venetian and French patent system working requirements.  Drahos also 
highlights the interplay between a country’s substantive patent law 
implementation and its patent office, noting that a country with a clearly 
delineated substantive patent law but no patent office, such as Indonesia 
between 1953 and 1989, is still unlikely to issue many patents, even though 
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the country received thousands of applications during that time period.  He 
further identifies patent offices as “crucial sites of interpretation of patent 
law” (p.11) indicating many ways in which substantive patent law can be 
manipulated through patent office rules.  For example, while Switzerland’s 
patent law in the early 1900’s provided for patents on methods, the patent 
office required the submission of models for all inventions, effectively 
eliminating the availability of process patents.  One current development 
Drahos considers particularly pernicious is the proliferation of claim 
drafting formats that facilitate the expansion of the subject matter of patents 
and that then spread virally to examiners in other offices who may not fully 
understand what the new claim format is protecting.  
According to Drahos, history and cost help explain the world’s poorest 
countries have patent offices and why they are being brought into the global 
patent fold.  Many offices in the poorest countries represent the lingering 
remnants of colonization when European patent laws were imported 
wholesale into numerous colonies through military or economic coercion 
(p.143).  As he notes, imperialism not only spread the patent institution 
much faster and farther than might have occurred naturally in developing 
countries, but the type of patent system seen in these countries would likely 
be different as well and more tailored to a particular country’s needs 
(p.113).  The fact that one could re-register a UK patent in Kiribati, a 
British colony, in the early 1900’s, had virtually nothing to do with the 
needs of the indigenous population but rather facilitated market division and 
relations among European powers.4   
Things are not much different today, as Drahos details the reinvigoration of 
the UK re-registration system through the European Patent Convention 
(EPC) and Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and the economic coercion of 
the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus bilateral agreements.  It seems to be 
déjà vu all over again.  He also illustrates how new patent colonization 
mechanisms are emerging, with many developing countries today having 
express (e.g., granting patents based on the grant decision in another 
country) or de facto (granting patents based almost solely on examination 
results from another patent office) patent re-registration regimes, a situation 
that may be far from optimal for the particular society in which the office 
resides.  He also uses the striking difference in pharmaceutical application 
filing rates in Vietnam and Cambodia to demonstrate an effect (a significant 
increase in total and specifically pharmaceutical patent applications) of PCT 
accession that developing countries may not fully appreciate (pp.270-272).   
Moreover, while there is nothing new in the assertion that the bulk of 
patents in developing and least developed countries are foreign-owned, 
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Drahos’ interviews with patent office officials in several such countries 
reveal a uniformly negative perception of the competence of local patent 
attorneys (except for those employed by MNCs).  While the perception may 
be based on reality, even where it is not, it points to a fundamental difficulty 
that local inventors in such countries will face in trying to obtain patent 
protection at home, let alone abroad. 
From a cost perspective, Drahos illustrates that it is relatively cheap for 
large developed country offices, such as the EPO, to provide a variety of 
“technocratic trustbuilding” aids, such as examiner training and exchange, 
examination manual production, and prior art databases to allow developing 
country offices to automate and “mimic” developed country office 
patentability decisions.  The trust developed also reinforces a hierarchy 
among patent offices, with the EPO being perceived by many smaller 
offices as providing perhaps the highest quality examination.  Moreover, 
patent  offices are jockeying for position in the global order, by, inter alia, 
seeking WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) International 
Searching Authority (ISA) status under the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) (recently achieved by Egypt and Israel in addition to India and 
Brazil), as well as seeking leadership positions (being the “go-to” office) in 
a particular region (p.254). 
Drahos provides a timely account of the origins of the global patent 
machine in operation today, tracing the history and development of 
individual patent offices with the enduring remnants of colonization 
providing a constant echo. He intertwines these strands in a narrative that 
describes a system divorced, in some cases, from the public and societal 
interest that justifies it. What emerges is a troubling picture of a global 
regime that exists to facilitate MNC collection of private taxes in the form 
of patent rents, populated by patent office employees who in many cases 
lack a clear concept of the larger societal ramifications of their actions. For 
example, with an anecdote from one of his interviews, Drahos illustrates the 
potential for disconnect between a patent office and the larger society in a 
developing country and how cheaply integration into the global governance 
network can be purchased: 
Patent official, Pacific island country:  We are planning to join the PCT. 
Drahos: Why? 
Patent official: The PCT will generate more applications and more fees for 
the patent office. 
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Drahos: What if more pharmaceutical patents are registered and cause 
problems for your population in terms of access? 
PAUSE. . .  
Patent official: We haven’t thought of that (p.336). 
Drahos traces this disconnect to the profound impact of switching to a self-
funding business model. This model allows offices to keep their fees instead 
of returning all revenue to the general treasury, but leads to a focus on more 
applications to drive revenues, and the efforts necessary to keep clients, not 
the public, happy and coming back for more.  This is a debate which is 
currently playing out in the US.  By creating dependencies on revenue 
generation from application and maintenance fees and the parties who pay 
them, patent office focus and incentives shift to being not only more pro-
patent, but also more sensitive to MNC interests.    This model has trickled 
down to many smaller countries, often resulting in a situation where the 
patent office may be very pro-patent, while the rest of the country may be 
more concerned about access to medicines and other development issues.  
Drahos refers to this as a type of patent office “schizophrenia” (p.254), 
which can be especially problematic when the patent office is looked to by 
others in the government for expertise in setting a developing country's 
patent policy.  
Drahos describes the domination of patent offices by a relatively small 
number of MNCs5 and the unsettling results of the TRIPS-induced need for 
developing countries to fairly quickly develop an examining corps and 
infrastructure to handle applications covering inventions in every field of 
technology, including pharmaceuticals.  This need not only results in heavy 
dependence on larger patent offices and WIPO “missionaries,”6 for training, 
guidelines, and technical assistance, but also on the training of examiners by 
patent attorneys from firms representing MNC companies (p.249).  Another 
unfortunate but not surprising result is that patent office hiring of examiners 
tends to further reduce the already small pool of valuable scientific talent 
that might otherwise engage in inventing and  technologically advancing a 
developing country from within an industry or university setting.  
Drahos delivers a strong indictment of patent offices—and the patent 
attorneys who practice before them and benefit from their pro-patent 
policies.  He argues that these offices all-too-often abdicate their national 
patent social contract responsibilities to their respective publics by 
pandering to the interests of MNC’s directly and indirectly, such as by 
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participating in treaty negotiations to create ever more pro-patent laws and 
policies.  To the extent one believes a pro-patent agenda is a good thing, 
these patent offices should be applauded, not castigated.   Moreover, while 
patent offices certainly play a critical role in the patent system, all of the ills 
chronicled in the book cannot be laid (directly at least) at their doorstep, for 
example, the historical colonization that led to the imposition of patent 
systems on many developing countries in the first place.  Nevertheless, 
there can be too much of even a good thing, which Drahos seems to suggest 
is the case in relation to a strong pro-patent agenda that has already begun 
to eviscerate the social contract.     
The picture painted by Drahos is not completely bleak, however.  He does 
note the virtues of several patent office initiatives in helping less developed 
offices handle the costly and resource intensive examination responsibilities 
required under their laws in a way that enhances quality over what they 
likely could do alone. He also highlights the genuine desire and efforts of 
many patent offices to draw more small and medium sized enterprises into 
using the patent system.  He also shows patent offices as the complex, 
multifaceted organizations that they are, noting, for example, JPO initiatives 
to help Japanese companies obtain patents in foreign countries faster 
(p.175).  
Finally, after delivering the “bad” news about the current global patent 
office system, Drahos discusses several controversial ways in which the 
patent social contract can be renewed and patent offices held accountable, 
such as the formation of outsider governance networks, introducing the 
separation of powers principle to break up unhealthy (to society) 
concentrations of power in the system, external audits, increasing 
transparency and more.  Some of these proposals seem quite radical and 
doomed to failure.  Nevertheless, incremental progress is possible.  For 
example, a positive (if small) transparency development in this direction 
since the publication of this book is the expansion by WIPO of an online 
search tool providing access not only to PCT applications, but also to the 
previously inaccessible (or difficult to access) patent collections of 24 
countries and three regional offices, thus enhancing public access to patent 
documents.7  Drahos also has special advice for developing countries, such 
as using their sovereignty to make patent offices part of the public, not 
private, nodal governance network, careful use of outsourcing of the patent 
social contract, and learning from the mistakes (and successes) of countries 
like India and Brazil. 
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THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES 
AND THEIR CLIENTS is a timely and, I expect, enduring contribution to 
the patent literature.  It should be required reading not only for patent office 
personnel, attorneys, and scholars, but also for government officials and 
legislators, particularly in developing countries, who could benefit from a 
better understanding of the role, motivations, and limitations of the patent 
office in their country as they  formulate laws and policies that concern 
public health, technology transfer, innovation, and more.  One need not 
agree with all of Drahos’ conclusions to derive a significant benefit from 
the book.  Examples of the trends identified by Drahos abound: Qatar and 
Rwanda recently acceded to the PCT, the IP5 continues to make progress on 
a group of worksharing initiatives, bilateral patent prosecution highways 
between various offices are proliferating, and the Vancouver Group 
(comprising the UK, Canadian, and Australian patent offices) has been 
formed to share work and results (between these offices having a common 
cultural and legal tradition), and create a new examiner worksharing tool 
with WIPO.8 Of course, how these trends will manifest themselves in the 
future and whether there will be significant benefits to individual countries 
and the greater global society remains to be seen.   
ENDNOTES 
 
1 The complete omission of African country/regional offices from the 
interviews is puzzling; however, several are discussed in later chapters. 
2 According to Drahos, “each time a patent office grants a patent, it issues a 
right to collect taxes” (p.8). 
3 Sadly, Kiribati is expected to be the first country to have all of its land 
disappear due to global climate change.  “Kiribati’s President:  Our Lives 
are at Stake,” ABC News, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=3002001&page=1, (last visited Aug. 
14, 2011). 
4 For more on this issue see Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of 
Intellectual Property:  Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the 
Global Intellectual Property System, 7 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp.L. 315, 320-
325 (2003). 
5 Noting that in 2007, 3.6% of applicants in the German Patent Office 
accounted for 60% of the applications (p.15). 
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6 Another fascinating account of this type of influence is provided in 
Carolyn Deere, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 257-58 (Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
7 WIPO Patentscope, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/search/en/search.jsf (last visited Aug. 15, 
2011). 
8 See, e.g., “PCT Newsletter,” June 2011, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pctndocs/en/2011/pct_news_2011_06.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2011); “Vancouver Group and WIPO launch new 
international work sharing tool to reduce patent backlog,” available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about/press/press-release/press-release-2011/press-
release-20110317.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2011); The IP5 website, 
http://www.fiveipoffices.org/obj.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2011). 
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Trademark law has come into its own.  Traditionally, trademarks were 
lumped together with patents as “industrial property,” with the law 
following suit.1  With the rise in consumerism, marketing and globalization, 
trademarks and the law surrounding their protection has become important, 
separate and apart from other forms of intellectual property.  After all, when 
more than half of Apple, Inc.’s valuation (deemed to be the world’s most 
valuable global brand in 20112) derives from its trademarks,3 legal issues 
surrounding the protection of such wealth are bound to arise.  In recent 
years, scholars have begun to focus their attention on this previously under-
studied area.  A testament to the richness of this recent scholarly upsurge in 
trademark law is Graeme Dinwoodie’s and Mark Janis’ compendium 
entitled, TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH.  
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY brings together a global collection of 
nineteen highly-respected scholars and is an excellent resource for 
practitioners, students,  and  trademark scholars, alike.  Dinwoodie and 
Janis have handily split the compilation of articles into three topical 
sections, which helps guide the reader through the variety of theories and 
arguments presented.  The organization also provides possible topical 
pathways to lead an advanced trademark law class or seminar, and thus is 
helpful to the educator as well.  As a note of caution, however, it should be 
made clear that TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY is not intended for 
the uninitiated.  Rather, the reader needs at least a baseline understanding of 
the standard accounts of trademark law in order to appreciate the 
scholarship represented in this collection.  This is especially true in the first 
topic, entitled “Methodological Perspectives,” which provides an array of 
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theoretical frameworks through which trademark protection can be viewed.  
Ranging from historical to semiotics to economic perspectives, each of the 
five articles in this section gives a slightly different account of trademarks 
and the law surrounding their protection. 
It has become a truism that the scope of trademark protection has been on 
an expansionist path since the early twentieth century.4  From an expansion 
in the subject matter that may comprise a trademark to an expansion in the 
scope of likelihood of confusion (the standard by which trademark 
infringement is tested), trademark law has progressively expanded in one 
direction: toward providing a greater scope of rights to trademark holders.5  
While one of the more standard explanations for such expansion has been 
that trademarks are being treated as “property,”6 Lionel Bentley questions 
this explanation from a historical perspective (pp.3-41).  Bentley provides a 
well-documented historical account that traces the term “property” as 
applied to trademark rights to the mid-to-late nineteenth century (pp.15-30). 
Bentley’s analysis shows that historical material can help with tracing 
different reasons for the current trend of expansionism and in explaining 
why the term property did not have a transformative effect on trademark 
rights in the nineteenth century.  Bentley concludes that it has likely been a 
transformation of the substantive meaning of the term “property” since the 
nineteenth century, rather than an adoption of a property rhetoric, that has 
resulted in an expansion of trademark rights (p.41). 
From Bentley’s historical perspective, the reader is treated to a semiotic 
account of trademark law and culture, through Barton Beebe’s thought-
provoking essay (pp.42-64), which provides the reader with an alternative 
theoretical justification for supporting and understanding certain trademark 
doctrines.  Semiotics, as “the study of signs and sign systems” (p.42), brings 
a structural approach to viewing trademarks, which is a different account 
than the standard economic one (p.43).  Beebe argues that the application of 
semiotics to trademark doctrine is a worthwhile enterprise because the 
standard efficiency arguments of economics do not fully account for certain 
trademark doctrines such as trademark distinctiveness and trademark 
dilution (p.43).  In fact, the semiotic, triadic structure of trademarks (the 
triadic structure consisting of a signifier (the trademark itself, like APPLE), 
a signified (the meaning or goodwill attached to APPLE, such as quality 
consumer electronics) and a referent (the tangible product that APPLE 
signifies, such as personal computers or cell phones) (p.45)), appears to be 
an implicit assumption in the standard economic account (p.48).  But due to 
the economic rationale’s failure to recognize the implicit adoption of the 
triadic structure, certain troublesome doctrines, like trademark dilution, are 
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presented as simply another form of trademark infringement.  However, 
when analyzed through the semiotic lens, it becomes apparent that dilution 
is far more problematic than already acknowledged, as it entails the 
granting of “absolute property rights, against the world, in that mark”  
(p.59).  Beebe himself leaves implicit that this expansion of rights through 
protection against dilution may not be what anyone wants, even those in 
favor of the economic account.  Perhaps more disturbing is that it would 
appear a semiotic explanation of the cultural implication of trademarks in 
modern society hints that further expansion of trademark law is likely in 
store in order to meet the consumer demand for “signs, distinctions, 
differences” (p.64). 
However, a re-examination of the search costs rationale (the economic 
justification for trademark protection) may provide some check on this 
trend, as Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley suggest in their essay (pp.65-94).  
Dogan and Lemley argue that if taken to the extreme, the search costs 
rationale may lead to a reversal of the goal of the economic justification for 
trademark law and lead to an anti-competitive marketplace (p.66).  
Therefore, Dogan and Lemley proffer a different application of the search 
costs rationale:  one that would serve to limit trademark protection to where 
search costs are lowered, but without going too far in the other direction.  
The reasoning proffered by Dogan and Lemley is that each of the doctrines 
discussed in the essay present search costs rationales on both sides of 
protection:  finding in favor of the trademark holder may reduce 
competition, whereas finding in favor of limiting trademark protection may 
increase confusion and thereby search costs (p.84).  Dogan and Lemley 
argue that courts will generally find in favor of limitations in a way that 
attempts to benefit the most number of consumers, where overall search 
costs would be lowered or where competition concerns are paramount.  
Additionally, Dogan and Lemley offer useful modifications in the 
application of these doctrines to provide courts with the ability to 
appropriately apply limitations. 
While the first three essays in the “Methodological Perspectives” section 
looks at justifications of trademark law and its expansion as a whole, the 
last essay in the section by Clarissa Long (pp.132-147), provides an 
examination of the forces that have created and shaped a particular portion 
of trademark law, trademark dilution.  Dilution is one of the more recent 
expansions in trademark law, beginning in the twentieth century.7  
Although Congress codified federal dilution protection in 1995, many 
courts applying the doctrine were unwilling to broadly interpret the statute, 
culminating in the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the scope of the law in 
The IP Law Book Review  25 
2005.8  Not long after this Supreme Court decision Congress revised the 
statute to reinstate its expansive scope in 2006.9  Long examines this tug-
and-pull of interpretation and legislation, providing a number of insightful 
explanations for why Congress adopted dilution in the first place and why 
courts were eager to narrow its scope  (pp.142-43). Unfortunately for the 
reader, at the time of Long’s writing, courts had not had enough time to 
fully interpret the new provisions of the federal dilution law (p.146).  
However, Long is optimistic and argues that courts should continue to act in 
conformity with their past actions as a counterweight to the Congressional 
expansion of dilution law (p.147). 
For a slight change in pace, the fourth essay in the series, Robert Burrell’s 
Trade Mark Bureaucracies (pp.95-131), looks at justifications for the 
registration of trademarks, which as he rightly notes, is an under-examined 
area (p.95).  The first main justification Burrell examines in-depth is the 
“clearance cost” justification.  This justification is premised on the 
argument that a trademark registry provides a certain level of comfort to the 
trademark applicant and to the consuming public: with a simple search, all 
who are interested know which marks are taken by others.  Burrell quickly 
debunks this justification by showing the problems of false negatives, false 
positives and the quality of the information provided by registries (pp.98-
109).  In addition, Burrell examines two additional justifications, first, that 
registration can provide protection to a trademark holder prior to actual use 
of such mark and second, that registration creates the property rights in the 
trademark.  Concluding that neither of these provides sufficient justification 
for registration, Burrell concedes that abolishing the registration system 
would be extremely difficult.  Instead, Burrell suggests a number of lines of 
thought that could be used to reform the registration system, including 
calling attention to the current emphasis on “customer service” that may be 
undermining the policing of applications. 
The second section in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY turns the 
reader to “International and Comparative Dimensions” of trademark law.  
Unfortunately for the reader, this section would be more appropriately 
named “International and European Perspectives,” as the essays (with the 
exception of Burton Ong’s bilateral free trade agreement-focused essay) are 
all focused on European issues of trademark law.  The section could have 
been more well-rounded if one or two of the essays were focused on other 
areas of the world, such as Latin America, the Middle East or Asia.  This is 
not to say that these essays are not invaluable, to the contrary, these essays 
provide an American reader with an insight into two of the top issues in 
current European trademark law: harmonization of the laws and parallel 
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importation.  These insights are desperately needed, as a good deal of 
discussion of American trademark law takes place without an inclusion of 
such comparative dimensions. 
For example, Annette Kur’s essay, Fundamental Concerns in the 
Harmonization of (European) Trademark Law (pp.151-176) and Gail 
Evans’ essay, Substantive Trademark Law Harmonization:  On the 
Emerging Coherence Between the Jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate 
Body and the European Court of Justice (pp.177-203), provide the 
American reader with a perspective of trademark law that really does not 
get raised in the United States.  Since American trademark law is federally-
based (for the most part),10 it is rare that discussions of harmonization of 
trademark legal doctrines across the fifty states arise.  In addition, with the 
ambiguous nature of World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body 
rulings vis à vis American domestic law,11 the harmonization of the United 
States Supreme Court decisions (or any other U.S. federal court) with the 
WTO rulings is not typically at the top of the list of trademark law concerns 
in the U.S.  Therefore, the essays by Kur and Evans are a welcome addition 
to the average American trademark law scholar’s (or student’s) knowledge 
base.  And while Thomas Hays’ essay, The Free Movement (or Not) of 
Trademark Protected Goods in Europe (pp.204-228), is focused on 
European concerns of parallel imported products, with concerns regarding 
parallel importation into the United States on the rise,12 this essay raises 
important and interesting issues for any trademark scholar. 
The last essay in this section will be of interest to the internationally-
minded American trademark law scholar or student.  Burton Ong provides a 
concise overview of the trademark law provisions of the various bilateral 
free trade agreements that the United States has entered into over the years  
(pp.229-255).  Ong shows that there are at least three categories of 
provisions that the United States includes in all of its bilateral free trade 
agreements.  Ong posits that these similar provisions (in the “TRIPS-plus” 
category) across the “web” of bilateral free trade agreements provides “a 
clear factual basis for those who have criticized the use of bilateral [free 
trade agreements] as a ‘forum-shifting’ device of sorts to set higher 
intellectual property standards outside of multilateral regimes such as the 
TRIPS Agreement” (pp.248-250).  Although Ong finds this movement 
towards TRIPS-plus trademark law protection worrying (pp.254-255), he 
concludes on a hopeful note (echoing that of Long’s conclusion), which is 
that in the implementation and interpretation of these various provisions, 
courts will be skeptical in applying these provisions in a broad sense 
(p.255). 
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The third, and last section of TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY is 
entitled “Critical Issues,” and presents four subsections of a variety of 
issues; the first two issues (free speech and limiting trademark rights) have 
plagued scholars of trademark law during its expansion over the past 
century and the last two issues (traditional knowledge and the edges of 
trademark protection) are of more recent vintage.  The first subsection, 
“Trademarks and Speech,” begins with a revisiting by Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss of her groundbreaking work in trademark law and free speech 
interests from the 1990s (pp.261-293).  Dreyfuss’ earlier work13 had 
recognized that the expansions in trademark law were placing pressure on 
the interests of free speech, with courts providing an increasing amount of 
protection to trademark holders of marks that were merely used in an 
expressive format (p.262).  In this essay, Dreyfuss examines the doctrinal 
approaches that have been taken globally to resolve this tug-of-war between 
protection and expression (pp.267-283), and argues that in the end, the 
better normative approach is for lawmakers to take into account the recent 
scientific evidence that shows how consumers actually deal with confusion 
(pp.287-293).  Dreyfuss concludes that some confusion and even dilution is 
inevitable:  “In an economy in which consumers have immediate access to 
products and services everyone on the globe, in a legal environment in 
which symbols are protected in multiple ways, in a culture in which 
trademarks constitute a significant medium of expression, freedom from all 
sources of confusion or dilution is simply not achievable” (p.293). 
Moving from general expressive uses of trademarks, Rebecca Tushnet’s 
essay (pp.294-323) examines an important connection between the First 
Amendment and trademark law (including false advertising law).  Tushnet 
points out that if the First Amendment’s increasing concern for commercial 
speech were applied wholesale to trademark law, many standard 
assumptions and doctrines would be overturned  (p.303).  The crux of the 
problem is that First Amendment jurisprudence treats true and false 
commercial speech as polar opposites; trademarks and advertising, 
however, can be confusing to some and helpful to others.  But the current 
First Amendment jurisprudence cannot take into account this type of 
“shades of gray” analysis.  Tushnet suggests that each area of the law could 
learn from the other, concluding that “[t]here are insights to be had from a 
hard look at the First Amendment from an unfair competition perspective, 
as well as from a hard look at unfair competition law from a First 
Amendment perspective” (p.323). 
The last essay in this subsection (pp.324-341), provides a fresh look at the 
overlap between trademarks and expressive uses from the perspective of 
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both the trademark owner and third party user.  In particular, Michael 
Spence is concerned that the current justifications for “allusive uses” do not 
provide sufficient support for restrictions against such use  (p.326).  In other 
words, Spence seeks to provide an alternative justification for the doctrine 
of trademark dilution, as it is more commonly referred to in the United 
States.  The justification proffered by Spence is one of “expressive 
autonomy,” which takes into account the right of the trademark owner to 
restrict allusions to its registered trademark, as well as the right of a third 
party user of the same trademark (p.331).  On one side, the trademark 
owner should be free from a compulsion to express something that it has not 
chosen, as well as be free from subsidizing a message it does not want to be 
associated with  (pp.331-335).  On the other side, trademark users should be 
allowed the right to allusive uses, despite these rights of the trademark 
owner (p.337).  Therefore, Spence identifies two situations where third 
parties should be permitted to make allusive uses of registered trademarks: 
first, where the use is necessary for the third party to “adequately” refer, 
comment or identify his own products (p.337), and second, where the 
trademark at issue has become an “important indexical function” that “the 
mark may have become a kind of public forum” (pp.338-339).  Spence 
concludes his essay by arguing that it is this ability to allow both the 
trademark owner and the third party user limited rights to restricting 
allusive uses, on the one hand, and allowing the same on the other, that 
makes an expressive autonomy justification “particularly attractive” 
(p.341). 
The next subsection, “Limiting the Scope of Trademark Rights,” can be 
viewed as an extension of the first subsection in that the authors are 
discussing ways in which trademark rights can be cabined.  Instead of 
focusing on the free speech concerns of expansive trademark rights, 
however, the three authors in this subsection each offer a different 
perspective.  Beginning with Jennifer Davis’ essay (pp.345-367), the reader 
is exposed to an examination of two similar traditions of cabining expansive 
trademark rights, one in the United Kingdom and one in the United States, 
with one tradition more vulnerable to modern limitations than the other.  
Davis traces a tradition of a “trademark commons” in the United Kingdom 
from the late nineteenth century all the way to the late twentieth century, 
where British judges protected the right of competitors to use registered 
trademarks that were of descriptive or “laudatory” origins (pp.347-353).  In 
contrast, the tradition in the United States has been one of a “public 
domain,” borrowed from copyright law (p.361).  Davis posits that it is in the 
different approaches to the trademark commons and the public domain that 
made the trademark commons vulnerable to “enclosure” (p.365).  Although 
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Davis does not explicitly state this, it would seem that an enclosure of the 
trademark commons has resulted in a limitation of the common law’s ability 
in the United Kingdom to cabin the expansive scope of trademark rights.  
Graeme Austin’s essay (pp.368-403) brings the reader back to the United 
States, where trademark infringement lawsuits are typically viewed with the 
belief that an application of the likelihood of confusion analysis 
encapsulates the appropriate, fact-based consumer response to a defendant’s 
use of plaintiff’s trademark (p.370).  Austin proffers that trademark 
infringement is not this easily resolved, and nor should it be (p.370).  
Instead, Austin suggests that courts should be looking “a little harder at the 
role played by the ‘ordinarily prudent consumer’ in trademark law” (p.371).  
In so doing, Austin offers that courts would take into account differing 
policies that underlie trademark law, which would be beneficial as it would 
serve to cement the role that such policies play in the development of 
trademark law (p.371).  Implicit in Austin’s essay is that if courts were to 
follow his suggestions, expansive trademark rights would be limited 
because it is not clear that an elimination of any likelihood of confusion is a 
benefit to consumers.  Utilizing the fair use defense in trademark law as a 
foil, Austin points out that there are other policies, such as competition, 
which benefit consumers but may be reduced due to an over-emphasis on 
the “unassailable empirical truth” of trademark law’s likelihood of 
confusion (pp.370, 402-403). 
As the final essay in this subsection, Eric Goldman brings to light the very 
real dangers posed by over protection of trademarks in the online context, 
where consumers utilize trademarks in their assessment of products 
(pp.404-429).  Unlike in the offline realm of consumer “word of mouth,” 
critical consumers in the online realm can be more powerful in shaping 
other consumers’ perceptions of products and brands (pp.404-05, 413). 
Although this creates for trademark owners unprecedented levels of 
accountability for their actions, Goldman warns that inconsistent application 
of current trademark doctrines threatens to undo this benefit for consumers  
(p.405).  More specifically, Goldman insightfully shows how courts 
applying current doctrines such as the “use in commerce” analysis, the 
inchoateness of likelihood of confusion analyses and the narrowness of the 
trademark fair use defenses, can function to excise online word of mouth  
(pp.414-428).  This allows trademark owners to delete from the Internet 
those reviews and opinions that are not favorable to the owners, which 
eliminates a crucial segment of information regarding products and brands 
that is beneficial to consumers.  As a parting reminder of the importance of 
limiting these doctrines (of which Goldman provides several helpful 
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suggestions), Goldman concludes, “[t]aken to the extreme, the depletion of 
negative online word of mouth reduces the utility of the Internet as a 
credible information resource, forcing consumers to seek other information 
sources that may have higher search costs” (p.429). 
The third subsection in this “Critical Issues” part of TRADEMARK LAW 
AND THEORY turns the reader to one of the more recent areas of 
trademark law scholarship, that of traditional knowledge.  On the whole, 
scholarly attention to the area of traditional knowledge and its relation to 
trademark law is more recent, as Susy Frankel points out in her essay 
(pp.433-463).  Historically, protection of indigenous peoples’ rights in 
traditional knowledge and cultural intellectual property has been considered 
more in light of patent or copyright protection (p.433).  However, Frankel 
and the second essay author in the section, Coenraad Visser (pp.464-478), 
show the reader that thinking of traditional knowledge in terms of 
trademark law is not far off the mark.  But both Frankel and Visser are 
quick to point out that trademark law has been used to both undermine 
protection in traditional knowledge, as well as boost it (pp.434, 464).  
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that both scholars ultimately conclude that 
trademark law is not the perfect fit for protection of traditional knowledge.  
Frankel suggests that a trademark-type of system to protect cultural 
intellectual property in signs and symbols would be beneficial, but one that 
is specifically geared to the needs and concerns of indigenous peoples 
(pp.462-463).  Similarly, Visser suggests that future protection of traditional 
knowledge may need to come in the form of alternatives to trademark law, 
such as the development of a “supranational information infrastructure,” or 
even a regime closer to copyright law (pp.477-478). 
The final subsection, “The Edges of Trademark Protection,” provides the 
reader with a contemplation of two under-explored trademark issues, that of 
trademark law’s intersection with copyright (pp.481-497) and trademark 
protection of product design (pp.498–522).  Jane Ginsburg’s essay brings in 
a well-rounded view of copyright’s influence on trademark law:  both the 
good and the ugly.  Ginsburg provides a critical examination of the United 
States Supreme Court case, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., in which the Court strictly construed the federal trademark law’s 
“origin of goods” language of “false designations of origin” cause of action 
to simply physical goods (p.484).  In doing so, Ginsburg argues that the 
Court “overlooks the role that the author’s name plays in conveying 
information material to the purchasing decision” (p.484).  From the bad 
influence that the Court’s misapplication of copyright principles has had on 
trademark law, Ginsburg moves onto the good influence, positing that it is 
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from copyright’s influence that free speech-based concerns are limiting the 
expansive scope of trademark protection (pp.490-497).  Ginsburg concludes 
that the influence of copyright law on trademark’s fair use defense “shows 
us that copyright concepts and methodologies can salubriously influence 
trademark law, not by cordoning copyright off from trademarks, as in 
Dastar, but by recognizing and drawing the best from the overlap in subject 
matter and (where relevant) in the rationale for extending or denying 
protection” (p.497). 
Last, but not least, Alison Firth takes up an exploration of trademark law’s 
protection of product designs, the so-called “Cinderella” of intellectual 
property (p.498).  Firth provides a true comparative look at the protection 
given to product designs under European, American, Canadian, New 
Zealand and Japanese trademark law (pp.498-522).  Firth points out an 
interesting paradox:  although trademarks “carry quality and ‘lifestyle’ 
messages as well as indications of origin,” product design, even where it is 
protected as a trademark, is held firmly to a traditional notion of a 
trademark, that of source of origin (p.501).  Although Firth is cautious in 
drawing any broad conclusions from her comparative analysis, she does 
note that in certain jurisdictions, like the United States, where design 
protection is based on more narrow criteria, conversely, registration of 
shapes is more generous (p.522). 
All in all, TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY:  A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, provides the reader with an excellent 
overview of the threads of current trademark law scholarship.  Each essay 
could easily stand on its own, but in such a well-rounded compilation such 
as Dinwoodie & Janis have put together, each essay adds context and value 
to the others.   
ENDNOTES 
 
1 See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
2 See Millward Brown Optimor, BRANDZ TOP 100 MOST VALUABLE 
GLOBAL BRANDS: 2011, 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.millwardbrown.com/BrandZ/Default.aspx. 
3 Compare Apple 10-K for 2010 (listing total shareholders’ equity as $47.8 
billion) with BRANDZ TOP 100 MOST VALUABLE GLOBAL 
BRANDS: 2011, supra note 2, at 5 (listing Apple’s valuation at $153.3 
billion).  
The IP Law Book Review  33 
                                                                                                                                                      
4 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 
82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839, 1840 (2007). 
5 See id. at 1900; Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death 
of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999); Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 399 (1990). 
6 See, e.g., Glynn Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367 
(1999); Lemley, supra note 5, at 1687. 
7 Some scholars trace the beginnings of dilution (as applied by the courts) to 
Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).  Frank 
Schechter’s seminal article, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 
Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1927), is considered the genesis of dilution in the United 
States.  See Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and 
Dilution’s Rocky Road, 24 Santa Clara Comp. & High Tech. L.J. 469 
(2008). 
8 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 
Stat. 985 (1995); Moseley v. V Secret Catalog, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
9 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 
Stat. 1730 (2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)). 
10 Many (if not all) of the states maintain a set of laws and a system for 
trademark registration that mirrors that of the federal trademark law (the 
Lanham Act) and the United States Patent & Trademark Office.  However, 
trademark infringement lawsuits brought on state law grounds are generally 
decided based on federal law precedent, with courts acknowledging the 
similarity of the two.  The only area perhaps where state law may have a 
unique role in trademark infringement lawsuits is in the area of unfair 
competition.  See, e.g., ITC v. Punchgini, 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(revisiting trademark infringement case based on New York state law, 
which provides a protection against unfair competition not based on use of a 
trademark in New York, versus federal law which does not). 
11 The United States has still not conformed to two adverse WTO dispute 
settlement rulings.  See Panel Report, United States -- Section 110(5) 
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000); Dispute Settlement 
Summary, United States -- Section 110(5) Copyright Act, WT/DS160, 
Summary of the dispute to date at Feb. 24, 2010) at 
The IP Law Book Review  34 
                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds160_e.htm (last 
visited on May 27, 2011); Appellate Body Report, United States -- Section 
211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 -- AB -- 2001-7 -- Report 
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2001); Dispute Summary, 
United States -- Section 211 Appropriations Act, Summary of the dispute to 
date at Feb. 24, 2010, 
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds176_e.htm (last 
visited on May 27, 2011). 
12 See, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) 
(affirming, in a 4-4 decision, the Ninth Circuit opinion that the first sale 
doctrine does not provide an exception to a copyright claim for parallel 
imported goods); Exhaustion and First Sale in IP, Conference held at Santa 
Clara Law School on Nov. 5, 2010, http://law.scu.edu/hightech/first-sale-
conference.cfm. 
13 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as 
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 397 (1990); 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So 
Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of 
Publicity, 20 Colum. VLA J.L. & Arts 123 (1996). 
© 2011 Leah Chan Grinvald 
Suggested Citation 2 The IP Law Book Review 23 (2011) 
 
 
Vol. 2 No. 1 (September 2011) pp. 35-52 
 
FIGURES OF INVENTION: A HISTORY OF MODERN PATENT 
LAW by Alain Pottage and Brad Sherman. Oxford University Press, 
2010. 212 pp. Hardback $150. 
 
Reviewed by Oren Bracha, The University of Texas School of Law. 
OBracha@law.utexas.edu 
 
FIGURES OF INVENTION could plausibly be described as Justice Joseph 
Story’s observation that “the doctrine of patents may truly be said to be the 
metaphysics of the law”1 meets Jacques Derrida’s iconic aphorism “there is 
nothing outside the text.”2 For the faint-hearted this is, perhaps, reason 
enough to skip the book, but this would be a grave mistake. Pottage and 
Sherman have produced an insightful, fascinating and original work.  It 
examines a topic that has recently attracted growing attention—the history 
of patent law in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—from a novel and 
uncommon perspective. In pursuing their project of retracing the emergence 
of the concept of the invention in modern American patent law the authors 
combine insights and methods from the fields of history, sociology of 
science and technology, linguistics, and law. The outcome is a rich 
synthesis that adds an important and illuminating layer to our understanding 
of how the most fundamental constitutive concept at the heart of the modern 
field of patents—the invention—was created and reshaped over the course 
of two centuries. 
 
What is an invention? Contemporary patent lawyers are rarely bothered by 
this question. Their focus is typically more pragmatically fixed on doctrines 
(such as patentable subject matter, novelty or non-obviousness), or on 
practices (such as claim drafting, prosecution of a patent application, or 
establishing an infringement claim in litigation). Nevertheless, the concept 
of the invention lies at the heart of the patent system. It is an element which 
is taken for granted, around which most patent discourse is organized. The 
underlying concept of the invention gives meaning to the doctrines and 
practices at the very same time that it is constituted and shaped by them. 
The invention acquired this status simultaneously with the rise of the 
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modern concept and praxis of intellectual property. The two are thus closely 
intertwined.  Scholarly accounts differ greatly in dating the rise of 
intellectual property with some locating it as early as the fifteenth century.3 
As Pottage and Sherman correctly point out, however, key elements of the 
modern ideology of intellectual property are the assumption that ideas 
rather than artisan skill or know-how are the prime movers of innovation 
and a sharp distinction between the artisan and inventor as the creator of 
intellectual ideas (p.29). Those elements consolidated only in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the area of patents the concept of the 
invention was the main locus where those conceptual developments were 
played out.    
 
Justice Story made his observation at the moment of this rupture when a 
new set of assumptions and concepts was beginning to take hold. This 
accounts for the metaphysical nature that Story associated with patents, and 
which he elsewhere attributed to copyright as well.4 It was at the time when 
one conceptual system was declining and another one was beginning to take 
its place that the background assumptions of the system were exposed and 
were experienced as metaphysical. Another reason was the obviously 
constructed, or as Pottage and Sherman put it, “fabricated” nature of the 
invention (p.17).  In the new scheme of intellectual property inventions 
were designated as intangible, ideal objects of property and clearly 
distinguished from any material apparatus, commercial trade, or person 
embodying artisanal skill. Once this happened, courts, lawyers and 
commentators were faced head on with the daunting task of having to 
define the invention and demarcate its borders. One, after all, does not 
encounter inventions in the abstract, idealist sense that the term came to 
denote in patent discourse on the streets or even in research laboratories. 
Beginning with the 1795 great English case of Boulton & Watt v. Bull5 
Anglo-American courts and commentators found themselves in a struggle to 
come to terms with the invention. The struggle took many doctrinal and 
conceptual forms, but in nineteenth century American patent jurisprudence 
its most elaborate and intense manifestation was the question of the 
patentability of “principles.”6 In 1835 one commentator in the Westminster 
Review described the word “principle” in patent law as a “law- fantom,” a 
“witchcraft used by the lawyers [that] consists in mingling three different 
meanings together, used by the aid of certain professional solemnities, 
producing a mystical word, capable of harlequinizing an idea into many 
various forms.”7 No matter how much treatise writers and judges denied 
this observation and tried to explain that the source of the problem was a 
semantic confusion,8 the vexing question of the patentability of principles 
came back to haunt them during the entire century.  Looking back in 1890, 
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the treatise writer William Robinson commented on this century-long 
confusion. He was too sanguine when he claimed that at that point the issue 
was resolved and the meaning of invention was finally pinned down by his 
“scientific” analysis.9 In the early twenty first century American courts are 
still struggling in a variety of doctrinal contexts to come to terms with the 
meaning and implications of the modern elusive concept of the invention. 
The overt theoretical terminology of the nineteenth century was replaced by 
doctrinal and normative discourse. The strong experience of the 
metaphysical nature of the law dissolved as the new scheme of intellectual 
property became established and as the  elements of that scheme became the 
silent conceptual foundations of the field that are taken for granted. But the 
basic dilemmas, tensions and indeterminacy generated by the fabricated 
notion of the invention remained, to a large extent, the same. 
 
FIGURES OF INVENTION examines how the modern notion of the 
invention and the elaborate conceptual framework woven around it came 
into being and how it mutated and evolved in the American patent system 
since its birth in 1790.  While in this respect the book is an intellectual-legal 
history, the authors’ main focus is neither law nor intellectual concepts. 
Instead, they are mainly preoccupied with what might be called practices of 
instantiation.  These are the ways in which the abstract concept of the 
invention became real, understandable and accessible in and through 
everyday practices in the court room, the patent office, or the patent 
lawyer’s office. At the heart of these practices are material media and 
techniques of representation: texts, drawings, models, deposited biological 
samples. Indeed, Pottage and Sherman declare, in what should be charitably 
read as a rhetorical exaggeration, that the “main actors are not people but 
material modes of representation” (p.17).  
 
It is here, at the methodological core of the work that Derrida (who is never 
mentioned in the text)10 enters the picture.  This core consists of three basic 
premises.  The first one is that inventions as intangible “objects” are never 
directly accessible. They always “have to be elicited from material 
embodiments… through the material features and observable movements to 
which patent discourse ascribes legal significance” (p.13).  The second 
premise is that these material embodiments are “like texts” in the sense that 
they always have to be “deciphered, interpreted and ascribed a meaning” 
(p.13).  This interpretive activity is “thoroughly constructive” in that it does 
not merely uncover meaning but rather creates it. The third one is that 
patent law and practice as a “medium of communicative action” (p.10) is 
not a system of straightforward representation in the sense of direct 
correspondence between “word and world” (p.9).  The sign (in this case the 
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various representations of the invention) does not constitute a 
straightforward image of its referent (in this case the invention), but rather 
involves a “risky intermediary pathway” (p.9).  All that is accessible to us 
are “chain[s] of reference” that are “fabrications that make the invention 
visible and tractable” and in contingent ways “condition how and what 
appear as the invention” (p.10). 
 
At times Pottage and Sherman state the third premise in ways that could be 
read as subscribing to an implausible but rather common understanding of 
one of the main tenets of deconstruction, i.e. the claim that signs are 
completely self-referential in the sense that they refer only to other signs 
rather than to anything in the world.11 When, for example, in discussing the 
role of the patent claim the authors remark that “when interpreters elicit a 
referent from a text they are not crossing a divide between word and world, 
they are moving along a chain of reference, between texts and quasi-texts” 
(p.144),12 this could be easily read as adopting the complete self-reference 
view. Its popularity notwithstanding, however, this view is both implausible 
and based on a misreading of the aphorism that usually serves as its battle-
cry “there is nothing outside the text.”13 A much more plausible reading of 
the claim does not deny altogether the relationship of reference between 
signs and the world, but rather rejects the notion that we can ever have a 
direct access to the world which is not mediated through signs. While signs 
(or means of representation) do refer to an external reality the latter is 
always accessible to us only through the prism of the former, with its 
mediating effect and its susceptibility to interpretation and 
reconfiguration.14  Pottage and Sherman’s methodological stance in the 
book could and should be read this way.  Their observation that “there is 
nothing beyond a chain of reference“ is only plausible if one emphasizes the 
crucial qualification in the second half of that sentence:  “or at least nothing 
that can be noticed otherwise than by extending or inflecting the chain” 
(p.148).  The focus of the work is on the means of representation for 
“fabricating” inventions not because there is nothing outside these means, 
but rather because inventions are only accessible to us and only acquire 
their specific meaning through these “figures of invention.” 
 
The substance of the book’s account is a survey of the various modes of 
fabricating inventions—such as specifications, models, claims, or the 
deposit of biological samples—as they developed, mutated, and interacted 
with each other during a period of almost two centuries.  The starting point 
of the survey is a brilliant analysis of the conceptual construct that was the 
focal point of all the various modes of fabricating inventions during the 
covered period referred to by the authors as the paradigm of industrial 
The IP Law Book Review  38 
 
manufacture.  Within this paradigm the invention was imagined as an ideal 
template from which a potentially endless series of identical material 
products could be reproduced.  The paradigm of industrial manufacture was 
thus firmly located within the social conditions, both material and 
ideological, of mass industry producing standardized commodities.  Of the 
various facets of the paradigm of industrial manufacture that the authors 
carefully draw out three interrelated ones seem particularly important. First, 
relying on Marx’s analysis of alienation Pottage and Sherman explain how 
in the new system of manufacturing the process of materially creating 
artifacts was completely “instrumentalized,” both practically and 
ideologically.  “[N]ew workshop organization, mechanization, and 
(ultimately) automation” (p.26) transformed the physical process of 
manufacturing into a series of standardized, monotonous and thoughtless 
operations and turned the craftsman into a mere laborer. Second, this new 
sharp distinction between the physical process of fabrication and the 
underlying design of the product or the invention embodied in it marked a 
new understanding of “disembodied knowledge,” clearly separated from the 
process of manufacture or from the skill and person of those taking part in it 
(pp.22-25). It was at this point that Marx located the appearance of what we 
call “intellectual property” which he described as the worker being “brought 
face to face with the intellectual potentialities of the material process of 
production as the property of another and as a power that rules over him” 
(p.29).  It was also the point at which “invention becomes a business and 
the application of science to direct production becomes a prospect which 
determines and solicits it” (p.30).  Third, this framework clearly designated 
ideas or disembodied knowledge as the central and most valuable part of the 
process of manufacturing. The intellectual original templates, as opposed to 
the countless physical derivative copies, became the “prime movers” of 
industry and the most important assets within it (p.20). 
 
Pottage and Sherman see the paradigm of industrial manufacture as lying at 
the heart of modern patent discourse, but their ultimate interest is in the 
various ways in which this framework was instantiated through material 
practices and techniques or in the “specific technical and practical networks 
that animate the discourse of patent jurisprudence” (p.43). The first 
significant practice of this kind in modern patent discourse to be analyzed is 
the specification.  The specification or the written description of the 
invention established at the heart of the field of patents a specific mode of 
fabricating inventions:  it textualized them.  From a modern perspective for 
which the textualization of inventions is taken for granted, it is easy to miss 
the contingency and importance of this development.  The written 
description first appeared in eighteenth century England, probably at the 
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initiative of patentees, for reasons that had little to do with the modern 
theory of the function of the specification.15  It was only in the late 
eighteenth century that courts and then commentators reconceptualized the 
disclosure in the specification as a crucial element of a “deal” between the 
public and the patentee, the act that constituted the patentee’s consideration 
in the form of giving the invention to the public.16  American patent law 
adopted this theory from its inception.  The practice, however, was very 
different from the theory both in Britain and the United States.  For most of 
the nineteenth century, due to a combination of practices, administrative 
attitudes and rules, the specification was not a readily available document 
disclosing the invention to any interested member of the public (pp.54-58). 
During this period the main function of the specification was ideological 
rather than practical. 
 
While acknowledging the ideological role of the specification during this 
period as a key component of the official theory (rather than practice) of 
patents, Pottage and Sherman locate its main significance elsewhere. In 
their account the crucial effect of the specification was turning the invention 
into a “thing” and thereby paving the way “for the emergence of the modern 
concept of invention” (p.59). At the end of the eighteenth century the 
invention came to be described in patent jurisprudence as the object of 
property rights. But seen as an idea the invention seemed to many, famously 
Thomas Jefferson,17 as lacking the essential traits of the traditional tangible 
object of property and therefore as incapable of being subjected to property 
rights.  The problem was thoroughly debated in Britain in the context of 
copyright and its own intangible object of property—the “work”—in the 
late eighteenth century litigation and public debate over the question of 
common law literary property.18  Like the literary work, as an abstract idea 
the invention had no visible or clear boundaries to demarcate an owned 
object, no markers that could indicate possession or what was being 
possessed.  The specification resolved or at least ameliorated this problem 
by identifying the invention with a concrete text.  It thereby “fostered a 
practical sense of the invention as something that could be possessed, 
delimited, or conveyed” (p.59).  The key to this effect was “recollection” or 
reproducibility—the ability to have a stable and concrete perception of the 
invention from which it could be communicated and reproduced (p.60). 
This created an analogy to or a partial substitute for the markers of 
possession and ownership that in the case of tangible objects were 
expressed in spatial and material ways. In the authors’ words, 
“reproducibility was a surrogate for materiality” (p.62). 
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For most of the nineteenth century the specification was neither a reflection 
of its official role as the patentee’s consideration nor a central element of 
the specific techniques used for conceptualizing and defining particular 
inventions.  During that period these techniques were dominated by the 
model rather than the specification. The twofold significance of the 
specification was located elsewhere. First, as Pottage and Sherman 
convincingly argue, it played a crucial role in constructing the invention as 
an object of property, thereby absorbing the conceptual and practical shocks 
generated by the modern notion of intellectual property.  Second, the 
specification introduced and placed at the center of patent discourse the 
basic technique of textualizing the intangible.  This technique was based on 
the creation of a separate textual layer that was identified as the invention 
itself or as capturing it in a form more amenable for the demands and 
assumptions of property discourse.  The significance of this development is 
illuminated by its contingency.  There was nothing necessary or preordained 
in the appearance of this technique and the assumptions associated with it. 
This is borne out by the parallel development of other fields of intellectual 
property, most notably copyright, that never came to rely on similar 
techniques of textualization.      
 
The next figure of invention covered is the model.  Whereas modern eyes 
tend to see patent models as curious toys or novelty items, relics from 
bygone simpler times, during most of the nineteenth century the model was 
the main means for representing and coming to terms with specific 
inventions.  The model dominated the practices of representing the 
invention to a much greater degree than reflected in the formal legal rules 
pertaining to it.  It played a central role in dealings with the Patent Office, in 
priority checks, in communication between lawyers and patentees, and 
especially in litigation.  During its heyday it was considered a much more 
reliable and accurate means for capturing the essence of invention by 
comparison to text or drawings.  In 1867 one judge instructed the jury that 
“[t]here is nothing, perhaps, more satisfactory upon questions involving the 
identity of several mechanical structures than the exhibition of the machines 
or accurate models of them.”19  An array of connections linked the model to 
the doctrinal and conceptual frameworks of the time and made it 
particularly congruent with them.  The paradigmatic invention of the period 
was the machine.  Jurists who struggled to conceptualize the patentable 
essence of inventions came up with a construct they called the “mode of 
operation” or later the “idea of means.”  Robinson described it in his treatise 
as “the intellectual essence of that artificial method by which the inventor 
has applied to some determinate end, the natural force.”20  This inventive 
essence was understood as revealing itself through observation of the 
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machine in action, as something that “can ordinarily be perceived and 
apprehended by the mind… only by observing the powers or qualities of 
matter, or the laws of physics, developed and put into action by that 
arrangement of matter.”21 Models, as Pottage and Sherman explain, 
“became an established means for communicating the invention because 
they were adapted to a form of mechanical knowledge in which machines 
were apprehended as ‘sensible objects,’ or as visible and manipulable 
artefacts” (p.87).  Models also fitted the modes of claiming inventions and 
litigating the validity or infringement of patents.  The nineteenth century 
method for determining the scope of patented inventions and of prior art 
was based on central claiming.22  This involved describing or demonstrating 
a core embodiment and then identifying the scope of invention as 
encompassing any variant substantially similar to it.  In litigation juries 
played an important role in regard to questions of validity, construction and 
infringement.  The model was the perfect media for these conditions.  It 
offered judges and especially jurors a three dimensional visual 
representation of a core embodiment of the invention that was accessible 
and comprehensible.  It is no wonder that “most patent infringement actions 
turned on arguments made through the material rhetoric of the model” 
(p.105). 
 
It was only toward the end of the nineteenth century that the model declined 
and lost its primacy to the text. Thus in 1879, reversing the earlier 
hierarchy, the New York Times could comment that the model “may easily 
be made to show features and principles not embodied in the original 
invention.”23  The rise of the status of the text also marked the ascendency 
of the textual element that today is most associated with the invention: the 
claims. Contemporary patent lawyers who tend to take for granted the 
equation of the claims with the protected invention itself may be surprised 
to learn that although claims were formally required since the 1836 Patent 
Act,24 they only acquired this status gradually and relatively recently.  The 
exclusive association of the protected invention with the language of the 
claims and the modern strict peripheral claiming approach (based on the 
premise that the claims mark the outer limits of the protected invention) 
developed in a slow process that extended well into the twentieth century, 
indeed, probably into the 1970s.25 Pottage and Sherman chronicle the 
process in which claims arose to this dominant status, gradually displacing 
or subordinating not just models but also the specification and drawings. 
They also provide an illuminating discussion of the set of techniques or 
craft skills—to which following one early twentieth century manual writer 
they refer as “claimology” (p.135)—that developed around claims:  drafting 
and construction techniques that simultaneously relied on and created the 
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new status of claims. Claims and models, the authors argue, are very 
different ways of representing inventions and of translating them into legal 
forms. Giving legal meaning to inventions using models operated mainly 
“within the context of the trial” (p.118) through a relatively free-form or 
common-sense-based manner in which “the process of translation was 
always taken up afresh in each case” (p.119).  Claims, on the other hand, 
introduced the invention in trial already coded in legal and highly stylized 
terms. Litigation arranged around a model (and premised on central 
claiming) had the form of inquiring after “the ‘real’ nature of the invention” 
(p.119).  With claims that are assertive in nature and already coded in legal 
forms the central underlying question became “whether a given mechanical 
feature could bear the legal significance claimed for it by the inventor” 
(p.119).  Claims did not change, of course, the fact that the legal meaning of 
a mechanical invention was “open to negotiation” (p.119), but they did 
fundamentally alter the frame and the dynamics of this negotiation. 
 
The last two chapters of FIGURES OF INVENTION are devoted to 
describing the ways in which the rise and gradual acknowledgment within 
patent law of categories of inventions markedly different from the paradigm 
of the machine—at first plants and then other living organisms—challenged 
both the doctrinal-conceptual assumptions of patent law and the existing 
modes of fabricating inventions. The framework that developed in the 
context of patents as “mechanical jurisprudence” did not collapse, but some 
of its elements came under strain, while others mutated and were adapted to 
accommodate the new subject matter.  Pottage and Sherman identify three 
main elements composing the modern notion of invention (within the 
paradigm of the industrial manufacture): origination, description, and 
reproduction (p.174). The emergence of new biological inventions 
challenged the first two elements. These challenges were met, at least in 
part, by rearranging the relationship between the elements and by altering 
their relative significance.  The 1930 Plant Protection Act26 that extended 
patent-like protection to new asexually reproduced plant varieties exposed 
the tension between newly emerging categories of invention and the 
dominant framework. Unlike the context of mechanical innovation, 
developers of new plant varieties were not inventors in the sense of being 
originators.  They did not originate the invention by creating and putting 
into practice a preconceived design, but rather captured and stabilized new 
plant variants produced by nature.  Additionally new plant varieties did not 
easily lend themselves to textualization.  The difficulties in adequately 
reducing such innovations to a written disclosure created tensions both with 
the formal requirement of enablement and with the established mode of 
fabricating inventions through texts.  On the formal-doctrinal level these 
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tensions were handled by relegating plant patents to a separate legal regime 
that, among other things, greatly liberalized the disclosure requirement.  
The more fundamental ideological challenge triggered a reconsideration of 
the concept of invention and, ultimately, partial adjustments to it. Most 
importantly, in order to accommodate plant patents invention was now 
theoretically framed as being “inductive rather than originating” (p.153). 
The emphasis shifted from designing and creating a new innovation to 
identifying and stabilizing mutations found in nature and giving them 
reproducible form.  This rearranged the elements of the industrial 
manufacture framework.  Whereas in the traditional framework the 
innovative idea preceded and controlled the reproduction, here the 
reproduction tamed the innovation and captured the idea.   
 
In the second half of the twentieth century and especially after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty27 opened the floodgates, 
biological innovations, no longer confined to a special sui generis regime, 
entered the mainstream of the patent system.  This extended the challenges 
first precipitated by plant patents.  What does it mean to invent a living 
organism?  Where does one draw the line between the “product of nature” 
and human ingenuity?  How are innovations of this kind captured, 
described, and defined?  Pottage and Sherman suggest that the basic 
conceptual maneuver used to normalize patents in living organisms was 
based on generalization and analogy.  From this perspective biotechnology 
came to be seen as analogous to mechanical manufacture because it “is the 
latest variation on the theme of instrumental—or instrumentalizing—
technology; just as the mechanical and chemical sciences instrumentalized 
inanimate nature, so biotechnology instrumentalizes animate nature, and 
turns organisms into manufactures” (p.181).  Accommodation of the new 
subject matter occurred not just on the conceptual level, but also through the 
emergence of new techniques for fabricating inventions.  Pottage and 
Sherman highlight in particular two of those techniques.  The first is 
disclosure by way of deposit of biological samples that replaced the 
traditional emphasis on “intellectual possession” of the invention with 
“possession of the biological means of (re)production” (p.193).  The second 
is the exploitation within patent practice of new scientific methods for 
taxonomy and naming codes for organisms for purpose such as drafting 
claims or analyzing novelty and patentable subject matter questions. The 
authors diagnose such uses as a new figure of invention that they name the 
“composite biological-textual representation” (p.200).  Drawing on the 
book’s theme of construction of the invention through interlocking chains 
of representation, they explain that the two techniques and others combined 
to fabricate the biological invention:  “[t]he material deposit, the written 
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descriptions of its competences (in the patent text and in the patent 
literature), the taxonomic data associated with the deposit, the claims of the 
patent, evidence of the state of the art—all constitute the elements of an 
operation of ‘induction between particulars’ from which the form of the 
biological invention  emerges” (p.206). 
 
Together these chapters form a fascinating journey through the ways in 
which the metaphysical emerged from the everyday, mundane practices of 
patent law.  The picture, as the authors recognize (p.18), is incomplete. One 
suspects that interesting variants of the story could be told about the 
development of the various ways of fabricating inventions in the chemical, 
electrical, and informational fields, as well as about what is known in the 
U.S. as “business method patents.”  Nevertheless, the work offers an 
insightful analysis of a broad swath of subfields of invention, undertaken 
from an original perspective that is largely unexplored in the patent history 
literature.  What else could one ask for?  Naturally, the answer is:  “more.” 
The remarks that follow suggest some relative weaknesses of the work, but 
they are mainly aimed at offering some lines of inquiry along which the 
implications and significance of the current account could be further 
explored. 
 
One somewhat disappointing aspect of FIGURES OF INVENTION is the 
extent to which it is not written as “history from below.”28  The term has 
multiple meanings in historiographical usage, but as used here it means an 
historical account which is empirically grounded in the actual practices and 
experiences of historical actors and which relies on sources that are 
relatively close to those experiences.  The book relies mainly on formal 
legal sources such as reported appellate court opinions, legal treatises, and 
patent manuals and guides that are several times removed from the actual 
practical experiences of most relevant actors.  Admittedly, the authors 
extract an impressive amount of data from the “traces” left in those 
documents, but the account based on them is by necessity still remote from 
being a rich empirical reconstruction of actual practices. To be sure, this is 
easier said than done.29  Moreover, since one can only do so much in one 
work, a more history from below perspective might have required 
compromising one of the book’s valuable features—its broad sweep.  Still, 
given the authors’ strong methodological emphasis on social practices and 
on the ways that material media functioned in actual activities of historical 
actors, it is noticeable that the work does not include much by way of thick 
description of such elements.  What exactly did patent lawyers, patent 
examiners, and patentees do during the various stages of the life of a patent? 
How exactly did the figures of invention surveyed operate and how were 
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they used in the courtroom setting or in lawyer-client communication?  Was 
the development of modes of representing invention shaped by the fact that, 
according to some accounts, around the 1860s a single law firm prosecuted 
about a third of the patents issued in the U.S.?30  To put the point more 
constructively, FIGURES OF INVENTION could be seen as a brilliant but 
still rather abstract and speculative framework for understanding historical 
patent practices; a framework that ideally should be filled with more 
concrete content (and inevitably be reinterpreted along the way) by 
narrower, and more empirically attuned future studies.    
 
Another issue which merits more consideration is the comparison of the 
history of the representation and fabrication of invention with the parallel 
processes in other fields of intellectual property that were haunted by the 
same fundamental difficulty of conceptualizing and instantiating the 
intangible.  A case in point is patent law’s not quite identical twin: the field 
of copyright.  Initially, it is tempting to draw a categorical distinction 
between the two fields.  Unlike patents, in copyright—especially copyright 
in books that were the paradigmatic subject matter of the early nineteenth 
century—the intangible object of property is already given in a relatively 
stable and concrete form of a text.31  It follows, perhaps, that in copyright 
there was less of an urgent need for creating additional layers of 
representing and fabricating the object of protection.  This line of reasoning 
is faulty, however, because copyright, whether it applies to texts or—as 
began to happen in the second half of the nineteenth century—to other non-
textual subject matter, involves its own constructed and elusive object of 
property:  the work.32  Just as the machine is only a specific embodiment of 
a more abstract constructed entity that is seen as the real object of patent 
protection, the text of a literary work or the material form of a photograph is 
seen as one specific embodiment of a broader abstract object known as the 
work to which copyright applies.  Indeed, the elaborate nineteenth century 
theorization of intellectual property as ownership of an abstract intangible 
essence that could be manifested in many different concrete forms appeared 
simultaneously in patent and copyright jurisprudence.33  Just as the 
invention can only be reached through chains of fabrication, access to the 
work always requires some mediating representational media. Although 
perhaps not as readily apparent, such means of fabrication are just as 
pervasive in copyright practice as they are in the patent context.  Consider, 
for example, the master in chancery report that was a standard tool in 
nineteenth century copyright litigation in equity,34 expert opinions and their 
various textual and non-textual techniques for dissecting and representing 
creative works, and legal arguments that construct through language works, 
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such as the “James Bond character”35 or the “Harry Potter world,”36 that are 
only manifested in a group of specific novels and films taken together. 
 
Copyright, in short, is based on means and techniques of fabrication, every 
bit as much as patent law, but not on the same means and techniques.  One 
significant difference is that, contrary to patent law, copyright never 
developed a stable practice of a formalized textual layer regulated by 
specific rules and conventions that is taken to be a full description and 
demarcation of the intangible object of property.  The point is twofold. 
First, there is a need for an historical account parallel to that of FIGURES 
OF INVENTION in the field of copyright.  Second, some complex 
comparative questions arise.  Given the ongoing struggle within the two 
fields with the same representational difficulties and the joint conceptual 
framework that assumes an intangible object of property, what accounts for 
the very different techniques of fabrication that developed within them? Is 
there something “really” there in the nature of the typical subject matter of 
the two fields that makes each amenable to different modes of 
representation?  Perhaps it could be argued that, given the subject matter of 
copyright, works could relatively easily be constructed through direct 
sensual experience of a concrete embodiment thereby making such direct 
experience the center around which other fabrication techniques are usually 
deployed.  In the context of technological innovation, the argument would 
go, it is harder for most people to construct inventions on the basis of direct 
experience of specific technological embodiments and therefore fabrication 
techniques tend to revolve around separate layers of representation such as 
the text of claims and the specification.  Alternatively, are the different 
modes of representation in the two fields simply the outcome of historical 
contingencies and path dependencies, of the fact that in certain moments in 
the timeline certain techniques were more readily available or simply 
accidently got entrenched?  Does the correct account combine, perhaps, 
elements of those two different explanations?  
 
Last to be discussed here but not least in importance is the question of the 
significance of the changing patterns of fabricating inventions uncovered by 
FIGURES OF INVENTION.  Why, if at all, did it matter that in different 
periods different figures of invention became dominant?  Are these 
techniques of representation “just a language” in the colloquial  sense that 
any speaker, as long as she masters the relevant forms and conventions, can 
convey the same content or make the same arguments equally effectively 
within each mode of representation? Alternatively, these techniques may be 
like language in the sense associated with the term since the linguistic turn, 
that is, language as constitutive of reality, as organizing and constraining 
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through its internal unique forms, structures and relations the very ways in 
which speakers understand and experience reality.37  From this perspective 
the shift from one mode of representation to another matters greatly because 
it affects and constrains the meaning of what is being represented.  The 
authors’ recurrent denial that one could have access to the reality of 
inventions in a way which is unmediated by chains of representation 
suggests that their sympathy lies with the latter alternative.  The book, 
however, never offers an account of the concrete effects created by the 
mediation of invention through different modes of representation or of how 
those effects were created.  Ultimately this is a variant of the old unresolved 
question in critical legal history of tilt or legitimation.38  Is it the case that 
frameworks of legal arguments or concepts may have a constraining or 
constitutive effect, in the sense of privileging or legitimizing certain 
substantive options and marginalizing others?  If so how does this effect 
come into being?  FIGURES OF INVENTION raises similar questions 
about the legal practices of fabricating inventions.  An elaborate account of 
the consequences of changing practices of fabricating inventions, if feasible, 
could connect these changes to social effects.  Were certain subject matter 
areas more likely to be seen as naturally suitable for patent protection under 
a particular mode of representation?  Did practices of constructing invention 
help to mold assumptions about the appropriate scope or shape of patents? 
Most importantly, were the legal practices merely after the fact practical-
ideological reflections of changes determined by other social forces (e.g. 
plant patents were introduced and the legal forms and practices were 
adjusted to that change), or did they play some active causal role in 
facilitating some outcomes and resisting others?  FIGURES OF 
INVENTION contains some interesting hints, but not a clear and elaborate 
attempt to answer these questions. 
 
That FIGURES OF INVENTION gives rise to these fascinating questions, 
even if it does not adequately answer them, is a testament to the quality and 
depth of the work.    
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